

Review by Tyler Lange, University of California, Berkeley

Here we have the collected articles of a senior historian who has contributed to a renaissance of interest in the political and cultural activity around Francis I and one of a series of recent studies by younger French historians that have considerably deepened our knowledge of how Francis's government functioned at its highest levels. François Nawrocki's study of Claude d'Annebault illustrates how some younger French scholars are returning to the *histoire événementielle* practiced by Robert Knecht over a long and distinguished career. The objection might be raised that Knecht's history is old-fashioned political history and that Nawrocki's is more innovative, offering what he describes as an “anthropology of the favored councillor.” However, the distinction between a good biography and an “anthropology of the favored councillor” may be one of taste when the sample size is one. Reviewing these two works together invites discussion of the status of political history, of the use of different types of sources, particularly with regard to historians' occasional fetishization of archival sources, and of the religion of Francis I and his courtiers, a question still, I think, unfortunately mal posée.

In the series of articles published between 1963 and 2009 by Robert Knecht we see the reign of Francis I refracted through a number of different prisms: religious policies (I, VIII, IX), the court (IV, V), diplomacy (III, XI, XV), humanism and the Renaissance (VI, VII, XIV), domestic policies (X), gender (II), and the bases of political culture (XIII, XVI, XVII). Some of the studies could be included under different headings, but all can fundamentally be seen as *travaux préparatoires* for or complements to Knecht's book-length studies of Francis I (1982, revised in 1994), of *The Rise and Fall of Renaissance France* (1996), of *The French Wars of Religion* (1996), or of *The French Renaissance Court* (2008), among his many other works. The volume begins with an eleven-page retrospective by Knecht himself, describing where each article fits in his journey from British medievalist to historian of what he describes as Renaissance France.

The first article, from 1963, on the Concordat of Bologna argues for a minimalist interpretation of the Concordat: France did not remain Catholic because the Concordat gave the king control of French benefices. Knecht anticipates some of the conclusions of more recent studies such as those of Véronique Julerot, arguing that the lawsuits generated by disputed elections meant that “it was not difficult for the monarchy, whenever it was strong, to determine the outcome of ecclesiastical elections” (I, p. 18). The Concordat's significance was instead to be found in how, “by discarding the elective principle to a large extent, and by conferring on the king the right to nominate to most benefices, it certainly helped to strengthen his hand. Whereas before he had often had to take the unpopular step of disregarding the
Pragmatic Sanction, he could thenceforth do so without feeling any legal inhibitions” (I, p. 20). It is true that “the Concordat did not produce the revolutionary changes that have been ascribed to it” (I, p. 31). It is less true that “the independence of the Gallican church was already a thing of the past” (I, p. 31), for the afterlife of the Pragmatic Sanction continued to echo into the seventeenth century and it was not until 1581, as Marguerite Boulet observed in an article that is not cited by Knecht, that the Concordat was effectively and generally implemented.^[4^]

The second article examines the role of the strong women in Francis I's life, namely, of his mother Louise of Savoy and his sister Marguerite of Navarre. Knecht exculpates Francis and his mother in particular of charges that he was weak and led by women. Tilting at the now passé windmill of Michelet's (and others') misogyny, he reveals easily missed aspects of sixteenth-century diplomacy: e.g., “Women were often used as diplomatic pawns, not merely in the obvious sense of being matrimonial baits, but also for the expression of views which might seem impolitic in the mouths of the king or his ministers” (II, p. 79).

The third article treats the enormously expensive Field of the Cloth of Gold, where Guillaume du Bellay observed of French nobles that “plusieurs y portèrent leurs moulins, leur forest et leurs espales” (III, p. 42). Knecht's charge that its chief result was that “Henry and Francis remained on good terms for about a year” and that “the eternal friendship that had been celebrated so spectacularly... had proved as short-lived as most international friendships are, alas ever likely to be” (III, p. 51), has been challenged by Glenn Richardson.[^5]

The question of the permanence of the king's household, examined in the fourth paper, touches on major issues, such as the applicability of the theory of the two-bodied king in France,[^6] and on the disparity in status between princely French bishops and English bishops of humbler origins (“Bishop Bonner, for example, was a disastrous ambassador in France, not only because of his quite exceptional tactlessness, but because he could not easily fit into Francis's aristocratic entourage” [IV, p. 8]) elaborated by Cédric Michon in his comparative La crosse et le sceptre.[^7]

The fifth article, on popular theatre and the court, is now to be read in conjunction with Sara Beam's study of the suppression of such farces over the course of the sixteenth century, a movement towards decorum and social discipline clearly incipient in the period at issue here.[^8]

The next two articles take up the question of Francis I and the Renaissance. The first prudently observes that “Francis I was less learned than had been his predecessor Louis XII” but far more willing to provide funding (VI, p. 19), even if, as for the lecteurs royaux, the insufficiency of that funding left them exposed to the elements. The study of Francis I and the mirror for princes has aged less well, perhaps because it takes Knecht too far out of his comfort zone into political thought. It begins with the troubling assertion that “among the first recipients of 'mirrors for princes' were the Visconti dukes of Milan” [IV, p. 8], nowhere citing Wilhelm Berges's fundamental 1938 study of medieval mirrors for princes[^9]. More problematic is the reflexive assertion that ideas had no impact upon political practice: “[Francis I] had fed his love of absolutism more on battles than on theories of government. Likewise, the limits on his authority had been the product of social, institutional and legal realities embedded in the kingdom, not of some political ideology. It seems that Francis drew no lesson from the 'mirrors for princes' that had been dedicated to him” (VII, p. 21-22). That is true, but perhaps Knecht (and Jacques Poujol behind him) were looking in the wrong place for the sites of political thought, as Patrick Arabeyre has claimed [^10]. Perhaps the jurists Antoine Duprat or Jean de Selve slipped some ideas about the applicability of papalist visions of monarchy into Francis's mind.

The next studies take up the question of religion. The first compares the early Reformation in England and in France, making light of French threats (to the pope) and offers (to the English and to the Germans) to create a national church, claiming that “it is unlikely that he ever seriously contemplated a complete breach with Rome” (VIII, p. 8). It is probably true that Francis never contemplated making his kingdom
Protestant, but it is likewise probably true that Henry VIII did not contemplate creating a Protestant England. Knecht, like many great historians of his generation, can only seem to imagine a break with Rome in the context of the adoption of later sixteenth-century notions of Protestant and Catholic orthodoxy. If Melancthon could accept the mass in return for communion under both species in the 1530s (VIII, p. 15), why then could not Francis I, “Defender of the Faith” according to the title of article IX, break with Rome and come to terms with such reasonable non-sacramentarian Protestants? Even after the Affair of the Placards in October 1534, as the apparatus of persecution waxed and royal protection for the heterodox waned, Francis “did not immediately abandon his efforts to reach an understanding with the German Protestants, nor did he stop patronising humanists” (IX, p. 127).

After examining Francis I’s extortionate relationship with the restive Parisians (X), Knecht retells the story of the Constable of Bourbon (XI) and of Francis I’s quite limited travels to the land of his birth, Aquitaine (XII). In this reviewer’s opinion, what is probably Knecht’s best and most influential article reappears as XIII. In it, he takes issue with Sarah Hanley’s The Lit de Justice of the Kings of France (1983). His critical review argues that the “Hanley thesis” rests on a distinction between lits de justice and séances royales foreign to the early sixteenth century. Knecht makes the crucial point, against anthropologizing or textualist, reductionist attempts to “read” ceremonies, “[c]ontrary to reference to all these circumstances... can the procedural arrangements, the speech of the president, the king's response and the edict he and his council imposed on the court be understood” (XIII, pp. 73-74). Knecht, a traditional political historian, here makes a point that complements the one made from a rather different direction by Philippe Buc [11]: for Knecht, ceremonies do not make sense out of context; for Buc, ceremonies are only ever known through consciously shaped, mediated accounts. Historians must attend to the prior and posterior “stage-managing” (XIII, p. 68) of ceremonies.

The following archeological and art historical study of the construction at the palace of Fontainebleau during Francis’s reign (XIV) illustrates Knecht’s openness to art historical approaches. Knecht’s account of Charles V’s entry into Paris in 1540 is a restrained reading of ceremonies which, just as he noted with respect to the Field of the Cloth of Gold, had little practical result: “Charles V’s voyage across France had proved an empty triumph. The web, if that is what it was, had not entrapped the fly” (XV, p. 105), and Francis and Charles were soon back at war with each other.

Study XVI makes an interesting comparison of the French and English nobilities in the sixteenth century. The differences often seem to be consequences of scale, in that France's larger territory could feed more gentle families and demanded more noble administrators, and of the tax exemption granted to the French nobility. The king of France could not govern his enormous state without his nobles and their ramifying networks of patronage. Indeed, these clienteles could turn against him, as in Knecht's example of the turn to Protestantism of hundreds of clients of Pons de Polignac (XVI, p. 65). In contrast, the much more restricted English peerage was more easily controlled through Acts of Attainder (XVI, pp. 75-77). It may also be that Francis I's more tender conscience—and less flexible judiciary—only counseled against the judicial murder of a few gens de finance. Contrast the painfully slow movement of the wheels of justice against the Constable of Bourbon with the trial of Semblançay or the rather large number of English peers attainted in the sixteenth century.

The volume concludes with a study of Blaise de Monluc, who became an author almost against his will at the end of his long and bloody life. Knecht's examination of this old soldier who took up “cette reserverie de me mesler d'escrire” (XVII, p. 108) to justify himself makes an important point that might be generalized to Knecht's oeuvre. Knecht takes Monluc, whose motto was “led by God, bearing the sword (Deo duce, ferro comite)" to have been motivated only by loyalty, by fidelity to the king. True, Monluc was tormented in his dreams by a flirtation with rebellion (XVII, pp. 110-112), but it seems inaccurate to say that “[t]he only religious test which he applied was whether his faith was the same as the king’s” (XVII, p. 112). Knecht evacuates the religious situation of its complexity. Had Monluc wavered in his loyalty on account of religion? Others did. Knecht's collected articles display an astonishing knowledge of the era of Francis.
I. But it is relatively one dimensional. This political history accommodates art history, certainly. Social history, legal history, and religious history make no more appearance than *histoire conjoncturelle* or of the *longue durée*.

Knecht's unapologetic *histoire événementielle* is on the face of it quite different than François Nawrocki's biography of Claude d'Annebault, which is political history that has swallowed good doses of social history, anthropology, and cultural history. Nawrocki's study forms part of an admirable project that appears to have crystallized under the supervision of Denis Crouzet. Cédric Michon directed a massive prosopography of Francis I's counselors that appeared in 2011, including four contributions from Nawrocki and five from Knecht.[12] Nawrocki's biography of d'Annebault gestures to the anthropologizing and cultural trends more evident in Michon's work (perhaps reflecting Michon's own advisors, Crouzet and Jean-Marie Constant), but rests more profoundly on awe-inspiring archival research. Nawrocki has tracked Claude d'Annebault's traces from the archives of Paris and Chantilly across France to the archives of Northern Italy on his way to the Vatican Archives. Though Knecht quite clearly has recourse to archival sources when he chooses, as in the edition of Charles Guillard's discourse to Francis I before the Parlement in July 1527 printed as an appendix to Study XIII, he more often chooses to cite printed diplomatic sources, in this continuing the grand tradition inaugurated and facilitated by the great nineteenth-century series of national sources. Nawrocki, by burying himself in the detritus of governance—the bundles of correspondence that made up much of the task—, gains a more finely textured of the work of governance in the first half of the sixteenth century. On this basis does he provide us his "esquisse d'anthropologie du conseiller favori" (p. 35).

Nawrocki's "sketch" is somewhat overlong and bears a strangely doubled structure, at once chronological and analytical, for it begins with the life of d'Annebault through his rise to power before pausing in 1546 or so to begin a portrait of the "favored counselor" or "counselor favorite" on p. 399 that continues for a hundred and fifty pages before taking up with the narrative again for the last year of Francis I's life and the last years of d'Annebault's own life. Nawrocki nevertheless affords us a very clear glimpse of the work of governance during the reign of Francis I, one that bears comparison with Knecht's view of governance in the period. The "conseiller favori" described by Nawrocki was at least three things: he was a beast of burden, opening packets of letters prior to the king's arrival (pp. 491-492, 506-508), a filter of information guarding access to the king's person (pp. 509-511, 519-524), and the head of a network expected to deploy his clientele to the king's benefit to accomplish the business of governance (pp. 455-478).

One did not arrive at the "superintendence des affaires" of the king (p. 548) without prior experience and without qualifications to act as the "fidèle exégète de sa volonté" (p. 559). Nawrocki begins by tracing the ascent of Claude d'Annebault's family from the eleventh century onward and the fate of its shifting patrimony in the late Middle Ages, for it was the painstaking acquisition of land through heiresses, as in his father's and paternal uncle's marriage to the two heiresses de Jeucourt-Trousseauville (pp. 48-51) or d'Annebault's own marriage to Françoise de Tournemine (he "devait probablement une bonne moitié de ses biens et revenus à sa femme" [p. 401]), that positioned d'Annebault to become a companion of Francis I, albeit a companion less threatening than Anne de Montmorency, whose ancient family, immense wealth, and potential independence were menacing. Although the pretense that d'Annebault was a "nouveau venu" snatched up from the "relatif anonymat" is perhaps exaggerated, the absence of any mythologizing about his lineage—and his sometimes craven flattery of Francis—made him "un serviteur beaucoup plus dépendant de lui, pour le prestige et le pouvoir, que ne l'avaient été les connétables de Bourbon et de Montmorency" (pp. 401-402). His administrative capacities and his only relatively humble origins among the *noblesse seconde* of Normandy place d'Annebault at mi-chemin between a Bourbon or Montmorency and a Sully or Pontchartrain.

Strategic marriages over two generations positioned d'Annebault to become a companion of the king when he succeeded his father as "capitaine des toiles de chasse du roi," that is, as keeper of the nets that drew game such as foxes, wolves, and boars into ever tighter enclosures for easier, more rapid slaughter (pp.
This lucrative office brought the son "circonstances favorables pour faire carrière au service du roi (p. 56). It was, however, d'Annebault's long experience as a (less) successful military commander and (more) successful administrator of conquered Piedmont in 1539-1540 (pp. 117-176) that combined with the diplomatic and curial discredit of Montmorency and the death of Philippe Chabot to make him the king's favored counselor. Claude d'Annebault "incarnait donc la conjugaison de deux concepts, la familiarité, dont découle la confiance, et la conciliarité, qui suppose des compétences éprouvées" (p. 451). This favor "n'est pas qu'un vain caprice du roi... Elle est un élément fondamental d'un système du gouvernement encore très dépendant des relations personnelles... La faveur est donc aussi une entreprise collective... qui rejaillit à tous les étages d'un édifice pyramidal de parents et d'amis (liens horizontaux), de patrons et de clients (liens verticaux), d'obligé et de serviteurs (liens transverses, fonctionnant dans les deux sens" (p. 685). Nawrocki proposes that d'Annebault succeeded in this difficult task because "[u]ne fois investi des plus hautes responsabilités, il semble avoir volontairement effacé sa propre personnalité pour mieux incarner l'esprit du roi: ce faisant, il devint une sorte d'ombre temporelle permanente du souverain sacré" (p. 687). D'Annebault made his clientèle an effective tool of governance.

This rich book contains much. I will single out two of Nawrocki's insights. The first concerns the council's burdensome work. Despite moves toward specialization into councils of war or of finances, into morning councils attended by the king and afternoon councils from which the king was absent, the favored counselor's presence was often indispensable. Unless d'Annebault was hunting with the king, he was at work, rising before the king to open the packets of letters and retiring after having shut the doors of the king's quarters. "[U]n jour," Nawrocki relates, "peu après la disgrâce du connétable, en arrivant au conseil, le roi s'était mis en colère en voyant que les paquet de dépêches n'avaient pas été ouverts. ...La nouvelle équipe de conseillers devait encore apprendre à travailler ensemble" (p. 226) and at times to work from "before daylight to six at night" (p. 229 n.7), according to a dispatch of William Paget to Henry VIII of 1541. D'Annebault learned this so well that the ambassador of the duke of Ferrara could write that he and his close and complementary collaborator the Cardinal de Tournon were "deux corps et une seule âme" (p. 460).

Governance was the work of a small handful of men, and truly rested upon the immense effort of the "favored counselor," a task which seems to have killed Philippe Chabot even with the aid of d'Annebault, Tournon, and others. Regnal transitions were therefore opportunities to redirect the channels of governance from the clienteles of the former king's alter egos to those of the new king's choice. This brings me to another of Nawrocki's insights. En bon chartiste, and as a good political historian, he reads Francis I's ceremonies carefully and in context. Nawrocki quotes a description of the heartrending situation of the disconsolate and ill d'Annebault, unable to participate fully in the ceremonies at Francis's tomb: "ayant la voix close de tristesse, ne pouvant faire le cry qui estoit à luy à faire" (p. 605). With more historical importance, he illuminates the puzzling ceremonial of the forty-day vigil over the king's body with the effigy and its meals that has given rise to so much speculation: "la quarantaine était un moyen commod de d'enterrer, en quelque sorte, un favori avec son maître" (p. 600). Thus would Montmorency be "buried" with Henry II twelve years later. Nawrocki's clear-headed scholarship clarifies the elaborate Renaissance ceremonies of the funerals of Francis I and Henry II: "[e] conseiller favori accompagnait ainsi dans la tombe le souverain qui lui avait insufflé l'étincelle de vie publique" (p. 601). Rather than representing any theory of a two-bodied king, and with a sheen of fashionable antiquarianism, the quarantaine of the dead king served the very practical function of preoccupying the dead king's favored counselor and distancing him from the affairs of state while the new king's own favored counselor or counselors now took over.

Nawrocki here seems to be of a mind with Knecht in his lucid analysis of the political reasons behind the ceremonies so beloved of cultural and legal historians. Even if it is somewhat painful for this reviewer, as a primarily legal historian, to admit, Nawrocki's and Knecht's focus on events and on high politics is illuminating. Histoire événementielle, yes, but also thick description of the summit of French society and government. Legal historians have something to learn from the practitioners of this type of history,
whether we call it political history or "anthropologies" of the favored counselor, financial specialist, king's mistress, and so on. The first lesson of these two books is that "constitutional" developments, such as the events of July 1527 in the Parlement of Paris or the obsequies of Francis I, are as much a product of political circumstance as of legal theory. Legal practitioners and legal historians have a tendency to overestimate the influence of the law on governance: Guillaume Budé, himself a maître des requêtes, observed that "we must needs confess the object of nearly all legal and civil qualification and training to be this: that with jealous and watchful cunning, as each one has a neighbor with whom he is connected by ties of citizenship, or even at times of relationship, he should... pare away, repudiate, squeeze, chouse, chisel, cozen, extort, pillage, purloin, thief, filch, rob, and—partly with the connivance, partly with the sanction of the laws—be ever plundering and appropriating."[13] In other words, historians' focus on the avatars of modern public law tends to blind us to the fact that, in Francis I's day, litigation was simply politics by other means. Law certainly influenced society through court decisions, but at the level of high politics it probably retrofitted to a sort of backdrop only occasional brought to the fore by an insistent chancellor. (One should not forget the falls of Chancellor Guillaume Poyet and First President Pierre Lizet, arguably on account of their failure to conform their behavior to the norms of court and council.[14])

The second lesson of these books concerns sources. David Pinkney's celebrated thesis of 1958 that the cost of travel and weight of teaching duties would prevent American scholars, after the doctoral thesis, from making a contribution of the weight of a thèse d'état on the basis of archival research was retracted by its author in 1991.[15] The thesis clearly applies neither to a Briton of French descent nor to a Frenchman. Yet Knecht's articles, which rely primarily on printed diplomatic sources—memoirs, relations, historians past and present—are neither archivally-driven history nor for the most part the conceptually innovative works of synthesis that Pinkney thought that Americans should write after their first book. Nawrocki shows the way forward from Knecht on a very important topic: the question of how politics operated. We have good answers to this question for the seventeenth century[16], far fewer for the age of Francis I. Knecht wrote that "[Francis I] had fed his love of absolutism more on battles than on theories of government. Likewise, the limits on his authority had been the product of social, institutional and legal realities embedded in the kingdom, not of some political ideology" (VII, p. 21-22). Knecht's sources do not permit him fully to justify this claim. On the other hand, Nawrocki's extraordinarily detailed biography gives us an anthropological snapshot of "un système de gouvernement en pleine mutation" (p. 34). But "en pleine mutation" vers quoi? The reach of an absolutism implemented through the clientele of a conseiller favori was limited. This type of absolutism required royal magnificence and intimidation, the often grudging cooperation of France's corporate bodies (truly a frein in the king's teeth), and the immense labor of skilled conseillers favoris. The king was not always magnificent or intimidating enough. Neither were corporate bodies often cooperative nor favored counselors skillful. Seventeenth-century absolutism, if it rested on the same theories of absolute monarchy, operated through bureaux and through clientes almost entirely refocused on the king. Knecht describes an absolute monarch. Nawrocki shows us how Francis was absolute, but absolute in a different way than Louis XIII or Louis XIV.

The final lesson of Knecht and Nawrocki concerns the religion of Francis I, arguably more important than the religion of François Rabelais. Knecht cannot imagine that Francis considered breaking with Rome, because he can only imagine this break taking a Protestant form. Nawrocki relates the revealing circumstances of the pan-confessional celebration of the alliance of Francis I and Henry VIII in August 1546, when "six cardinaux... ne s'émurent guère d'entendre qualifier le roi d'Angleterre de 'défenseur de la foi' et de 'chef suprême de l'Église d'Angleterre'" (p. 390). Was this just political prudence? Thomas Cranmer claimed that "il fut alors [en 1546] question de l'adoption d'une liturgie commune entre les deux royaumes, et du rejet de l'autorité du pape dans le royaume de France" (p. 395), causes pushed by Henry also in 1534 and 1538. Nawrocki describes d'Annebault's religious sentiments as, probably like those of his master, "en apparence ouvertes, mais au fond, profondément traditionnelles" (p. 424). But what was tradition in Gallican France? Was it the uncompromising, radically antihumanist, almost innovative orthodoxy of Noël Béda? During his stay in England, Claude d'Annebault "avait abordé, sans le moindre
etat d'ame, l'idée d'une sécession de l'église du royaume de France et de réformes liturgiques, qui seraient passées par un concile général" (p. 425). Furthermore, "aux yeux de l'amiral, la discipline et surtout l'obéissance aux ordres du roi compptaient plus que l'observance de principes religieux" (p. 428). Precisely which "religious principles" would be infringed by a national Catholic church? Nawrocki advises, "l'amiral d'Annebault était probablement partisan de l'obéissance au roi qui, comme le roi d'Angleterre, eût bien pu entrainer son Église dans une réforme hors du giron romain. Peut-être a-t-il lui-même, avec le cardinal de Tournon, conseillé François Ier en ce sens" (p. 429). Although Nawrocki identifies financial and political rather than confessional reasons for this potential policy, Alain Tallon and Thierry Wanegffelen have shown just how broad the religious center was in Gallican France.[17] Sacramentarians were certainly excluded after the Affair of the Placards, but which theological as opposed to ecclesiological issues divided the Anglican from the Gallican church in 1534, in 1538, or in 1546?

There is much to consider in both Knecht's collected articles and Nawrocki's biography. Good political history is neither dead nor otiose but continues to raise questions of interest to other modes of historians.

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