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CALLIERES ON PEACE POLITICS

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Abstract:
The negotiation theory that François de Callières (1645-1716) built promotes peace politics in the international arena. First, we develop the political rationality that prevailed in the 17th Century, essentially under the realm of Louis XIV. European power politics is dominated by the recurrence of wars. In that context, negotiation is crucial, but essentially conceived as a means at the disposal of a bellicose agenda. Afterwards, Callières is shown to propose a more ambitious alternative vision for future negotiators, and suggests they could be the key-players in peace politics, as long as the use of powerful persuasion serves legitimate ends. Then European nations, with the interdependence of their interests can form one republic aspiring to common prosperity.

Keywords:

Résumé :
La théorie de la négociation élaborée par François de Callières (1645-1716) favorise une politique de la paix sur la scène internationale. D’abord, nous développons la rationalité politique européenne qui prévaut au 17e siècle ; elle est dominée par la récurrence des guerres, sous le règne de Louis XIV. Dans ce contexte, la négociation est cruciale, mais essentiellement conçue comme un moyen à la disposition d’un agenda belliqueux. Ensuite, nous montrons comment Callières propose une vision alternative plus ambitieuse pour les négociateurs futurs et suggère qu’ils peuvent être des acteurs-clés d’une politique de paix, tant que l’usage de leurs moyens puissants de persuasion servent des fins légitimes. Alors, les nations européennes, à travers l’interdépendance de leurs intérêts, peuvent former une république aspirant à une prospérité commune.

Mots-clés :
“Such is, judicious Callières,
The Great Work of Peace,
Which covers your name in Light,
And forever makes it famous,
France admires your stature
Among its long cries of elation,
Of all peoples rejoicing.”

Charles Perrault,
*Ode to François de Callières on Peace Negotiation*, 1698.

If Charles Perrault, who is better known for his fairy tales, congratulated François de Callières, negotiator, for his contribution to the *Peace Treaty of Ryswick* (1697), we may as much pay tribute today to the negotiation theoretician, for his pioneering work on peace theory, *On the Manner of Negotiating with Princes* (1716). The quality of this text, especially when combined with another less known of his books *The Knowledge of the World, and the Attainments Useful in the Conduct of Life* (1717), lies not simply in its elegant style, but in its acuity and modernity of concepts and precepts, which include recommendations for negotiation preparation, process, and analysis, but which also proposes a rhetorical foundation for peace politics that will be examined in this paper.

Callières, who lives through decades of recurring European wars and knows very well the many diplomatic attempts to put an end to them, develops an anthropological philosophy where the “honnête homme” and the ruler must strive to preserve peace through persuasion, as well as a theory of the foundations of politics as the “art of handling hearts”, where negotiation is central, not simply as a set of skills, but as a way of life in society, both internally and on the European scene. Very pragmatically and in a very modern fashion, Callières calls for the need for national sovereign authorities to build a network of skillful and legitimate negotiators, whose end is to make nations prosper together.

The first part of this article focuses on the political rationality that prevailed in the 17th Century, essentially under the realm of Louis XIV. In this context of European power politics, that is dominated by the recurrence of wars, and that Callières was familiar with as a diplomat himself, negotiation is crucial, but essentially conceived as a means at the disposal of a bellicose agenda. In the second part, we show how Callières proposes a more ambitious alternative vision for future negotiators, and suggests they could be the key-players in peace politics, as long as the use of powerful persuasion serves legitimate ends of European nations. Then the latter, with the interdependence of their interests, can form one republic aspiring to common prosperity.
From War Politics to People’s Exhaustion

War is a never ending story during the 17th Century, the “Great Century” as the French call it. In this context, negotiation is the servant of war; and diplomats often simply further a bellicose politics. Alliances and peace treaties are made and unmade according to the wishes of powers, however big or small. The European equilibrium of states is fragile, but knows a series of successes. Ups of peace and downs of war alternate every few years. All throughout the later half of the century, diplomacy, as well as many texts that account for its action, plays a central role, as a possible alternative to war, and it will frame Callières’ understanding of politics and his own theory.

Callières’s 17th Century Sources on Negotiations

Sources not lacking, Callières reads the rich diplomatic correspondence, as he indicates in Chapter 5 of his Manner of Negotiating (1716) and as we illustrate in our bibliography of primary sources at the end of this text. From his own acknowledgement and from the inventory of his library, he learns about best practices from Cardinal d’Ossat, President Jeannin and Marshal Bassompierre, who at the end of the 16th Century and later, served as ambassadors kings François I, Henri IV and Louis XIII of France. This proclivity of negotiators who detail their activities in letter exchanges is not the end of the story. Books account for peace negotiations as a way of preventing, or finishing wars, but also as a way for ambassadors to justify their actions in court or with the public, and sometimes for countries to account for their own foreign policy. For example, the difference of opinions that opposed Claude d’Avaux and Abel Servien, emissaries of Richelieu and Mazarin, to the preliminary negotiations of the Treaties of Westphalia led to a book. Prime minister Richelieu, who dies in 1644, recognizes, in his Political Testament, how negotiations are central in public action:

“States receive so many advantages from continual negotiations, when they are conducted with prudence, that it is not possible to know it, if one does not know it from experience. […] I dare to say that negotiating at all times, openly or secretly, in all places, though one does not receive a present fruit and though the fruit one expects for the future is not apparent, is a very important asset for the good of the states.”

The cardinal’s lessons will be well understood and practiced by professional negotiators. Perpetual negotiations at all times and places must be led, even independently of a specific object and of an immediate return, precisely because they may one day serve a precise outcome. The key recommendation: it is often too late to start negotiating when we have something to negotiate. What I

1 The various works made reference to are included at the end of the bibliography: Ossat (1624) and President Jeannin (1656), Bassompierre (1668). Callière’s library is printed in Callières, Practice of Diplomacy (1983), pp. 219-224.
2 Claude d’Avaux and Servien (1650).
have called the “negotiation fallow”, i.e. resting in the other’s company, enjoying the pleasure of the conversation, not trying to achieve any outcome right now, helps build a relationship, which is very often a preliminary condition to later business talks. It is as much a matter of politeness and good manners as it is a way of knowing the other better. In France, still today, you would not talk about business before a meal is nearly ending; you would do it between “la poire et le fromage” (“the pear and the cheese”).

Later in the second half of the century, a new generation of negotiators, as skilled as their predecessors in the art of socializing, emerges with Hugues de Lionne, Estrades and another count d’Avaux. They help Louis XIV in building offensive or defensive alliances and follow his propensity to often favor warlike rather than peaceful resolution. Some of their correspondences were not printed until the next century. However, we may suppose that the content of their continual negotiations occupied conversations at the court and among diplomats, including Callières. As secretary of the king’s cabinet from 1701 to 1708 and predisposed to writing, Callières had no difficulty to get acquainted with a number of diplomatic texts and write some himself.

This ensemble of documents that Callières consulted and the illustrations he extracts from them and from his own experience as a diplomat constitute enough empirical matter for his synthesis on peace politics and negotiation, particularly if we add the contributions of Vittorio Siri and of Abraham de Wicquefort, whose two volumes on the ambassador’s functions Callières also read. All these works enlarge the already impressive body of literature and complete it with non-French perspectives on negotiation and together form a corpus in search of structuring.

The events which agitated Europe at the beginning of the 18th Century did not change Callières’s profound convictions preferring negotiation to war. The virtue of his analyses arises not

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4 Grandmont and Lionne (1659), Estrades (1710) and Jean-Antoine d’Avaux (1752).
5 Important position that required a high-level of fidelity, the secretary of the king was able to “imitate so closely the king’s handwriting that sometimes it was difficult to tell the difference.” Saint-Simon, Mémoires I (1990), p. 53.
6 Siri (1677) and Wicquefort (1673, 1676). Ambassador Wicquefort could not be openly cited, because of his expulsion from France by Prime Minister Mazarin, after he had revealed the affairs of the king with the niece of the Prime Minister in his diplomatic accounts.
7 Probably preoccupied with confidentiality and prudence, in his final text, Callières chooses not to comment on events after Ryswick (1697), where he was the key negotiator. As Keens-Soper and Schweizer note in their 1983 English edition of Callières’ book, everything leads to believe that Callières’s work could have been published earlier, not simply because of the epistle found in the archives originally dedicated to Louis XIV, but also because of its content. If there is a short reference made to the Treaty of Ryswick, for example, it evokes in no way the Spanish Succession, which was a French preoccupation on a military and diplomatic levels from 1701 onward. Callières, however, did not abstain in his memoranda to the Secretary of State, Torcy, from noting that he was in favor of a negotiated agreement for an equitable partition of the Spanish heritage and an appeasement of the Dutch. The fact that Callières did not mention this in his work suggests a disagreement with France’s foreign policy of hegemony through wars of the time. See “Introduction,” by H.M.A. Keens-Soper and Karl W.
simply out of a particular situation, but reveals a general set of ideas. The integration of more recent events, such as those related to the war of the Spanish Succession after 1701, would have nothing to the persuasive value of his conclusions. Moreover, had it been included, though it would have assured a better, more immediate diffusion, it could also have nurtured a polemic, which Callières probably wanted to avoid at the end of his life and which would not have helped him in his enterprise of spreading the word about the high value of diplomacy, and peace equilibrium.

At his epoch, Callières is without rival to build the needed synthesis. He establishes the foundation of a negotiation, transcending time and place. He goes beyond diplomatic documents, which, attached to a particular negotiation within a specific context, lacks distance in relation to the events and does not succeed at inferring recurrent phenomena which help build a conceptual framework for alternative politics. Callières is impregnated in the negotiation data of his time, but he shows himself to be skilled enough in getting to the heart of the matter. He founds his approach on common sense, analyzes, criticizes, and makes evident good practices that can keep rulers and their diplomats away from negotiation failures and the terrible outrage of wars. As we will see, more than just thinking about the use of negotiation in a context of war, he proposes to us, in a certain way, an essay on peaceful methods of conflict prevention and resolution, a first rational approach to the negotiation process and skills. He is, in that sense, the original theoretician of negotiation, and initiates us to the profession and art of diplomacy.

The 17th Century of Wars and Related Negotiations

When looking at European history of the 17th Century, politics looks as a succession of battles and negotiation tables. Just to give a few examples. The Thirty-Year War (1618-1648) was the first truly European war, when we consider all the continental countries fighting on German soil; it led to one of the longest peace talks in European history, with 179 diplomats representing 194 sovereignties, in Munster and Osnabrück, where a hundred diplomats worked from 1643 until 1648. This was “a truly European Congress. Nearly all the powers were represented, except the czar of


8 In order to account for the success of Callières’ On the Art of Negotiating with Princes, suffice it to say that it had been translated shortly after its first publication in 1716 in German, English, and Italian, as well as in Russian after its republications in French in 1750, 1757 and 1766. Though it was not published in French since 1766 until our 2002 edition, Callières’s work was published four times in English in the 20th Century and also published in Polish and in Japanese.

9 Wicquefort attempted to establish such a synthesis but he defeats himself in his analysis of details and in his collection of facts, anecdotes and customs. In his text, Callières falls only once into Wicquefort’s pitfalls, when he addresses questions of title and protocol in Chapters 6, 7 and 10. These are the only chapters in his work in which the text seems dated, particularly concerning Callières’s distinctions of rank. For their particularity, these passages present, nevertheless, an interest for a researcher or a practitioner who is dealing with highly codified hierarchical cultures.

Moscovia, the sultan and the king of England.”\textsuperscript{11} One of the ambassadors summarized the alternation of peace discussions and war campaigns: “during the winter, we negotiate; during the summer, we fight”\textsuperscript{12}. Brienne, the French Secretary of State writes to his plenipotentiaries: “It is essential not to stop the war, because it is the only means at our disposal to urge them to progress on the road to peace... Experience has shown that the progress of arms was the most probing reason that we can give you to convince the enemy to consent to equitable conditions towards peace.”\textsuperscript{13}

The Peace Treaties of Westphalia will be finally concluded\textsuperscript{14}; and will be remembered in Germany for years.\textsuperscript{15} The peace was not total however; two countries remained at war, France and Spain, fighting for dominance in Europe from 1648 on. It is only in 1659 that the four-month negotiations between prime minister Luis de Haro, for Spain, and his French counterpart, Cardinal Mazarin, led to the signature of the Treaty of Pyrénées (1659) on the island of Pheasants what is still called today the “island of the conference”, on the Bidassoa river bordering the two nations.\textsuperscript{16} For the first time since the 14\textsuperscript{th} Century, thanks to Mazarin, France could claim peace and security along its borders.\textsuperscript{17}

From infancy to adult life, Louis XIV had followed his apprenticeship of politics as war during the first 21 years of his life; he had only known France involved in wars until 1659. When Mazarin dies in 1661, Louis XIV starts ruling alone without prime minister, as an absolute king (\textit{The State, it is me}); he will also make ongoing wars and related negotiations a centerpiece of his politics. The Devolution War (1667-1668), was decided by Louis XIV who claimed the Spanish Netherlands as his heritage, on behalf of his wife Marie-Thérèse, daughter of the King of Spain. After a very successful military campaign and the split of his own cabinet between the peace partisans – Colbert, Lionne and Le Tellier – and the war partisans – Condé, Louvois and Turenne –, Louis XIV finally decided to put an end to this war in the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle. The Holland War (1672-1678) was even more the king’s decision, and hard for him to justify, except by his politics of grandeur and expansion.\textsuperscript{18} Several offers by the Dutch de Groot were refused by Louis XIV. Humiliating counter-offers were sent, and the war dragged on at the expense of French finances and morale. England, and later Rome and Venise proposed their mediation until the nine Treaties of Nijmegen (1679) finally concluded three years of peace talks.\textsuperscript{19} This is the time where France is without any doubt preponderant in Europe, and Louis XIV becomes Louis le Grand, though he has now alienated most of European nations against him, including many small German states that Richelieu and Mazarin had

\textsuperscript{11} Bély & alii (1991), p. 177.
\textsuperscript{12} Bély (1992), p. 156.
\textsuperscript{13} Quoted by Craxton in Bély (2000), p. 271.
\textsuperscript{14} Bély (2000).
\textsuperscript{15} Gantet (2001).
\textsuperscript{16} Mazarin (1690), Callières (2002), p. 201.
\textsuperscript{17} Lossky (1994), p. 60.
\textsuperscript{18} Sonnino (1988).
\textsuperscript{19} Estrades (1710, 1743)
made zealous partisans of France as warrantor against the Emperor. A policy of “reunions”, where some territories were claimed by negotiation and threats of war, was conducted and led to the War of the Reunions (1683-84), which was itself concluded by the Ratisbonne Truce. The Nine-Year War (1688-1697), where France and Holland are again at war, ends after three years of negotiations, where Callières is strongly involved, secretly and then openly as a plenipotentiary ambassador at a forty-diplomats conference held in Ryswick, until Marshall Boufflers for France and Bentinck for England took over and signed the peace treaty, for which Perrault praised Callières’ contribution. In order to understand better this litany of wars, mixed with negotiations, Lynn summarizes it as “war-as-process” with five characteristics: “the indecisive character of battle and siege, the slow tempo of operations, the strong resolve to make war feed war, the powerful influence of attrition, and the considerable emphasis given to ongoing negotiations.”

Under Richelieu and his pupil Mazarin, balance of powers was the apparent objective of war policy and alliances aim at counterbalancing the claim to universal monarchy of the Spanish and Austrian Habsbourg. Later, in 1659, when this goal was definitively achieved, the power had shifted towards France in Europe. As the master of a more-than-ever-before centralized nation, Louis the Great waged insatiable military campaigns, supposedly to insure France’s ‘pré carré” (square field), i.e. defensible natural borders (the North Sea, the Rhine, the Alps, the Mediterranean Sea, the Pyrénées), but in fact war was inherent in the king’s search for gloire; it defined his own job per se as king, in the line of the nobility who would consider their very existence and value dependable on their military grandeur. This bellicose policy was often perceived with growing impatience by the other European countries as threatening, illegitimate and arrogant. And when in 1715 Louis XIV’s realm was over, France, in social and economic exhaustion, had lost much of its high ground, and was to be progressively replaced in legitimacy and strength by England as the dominant power.

The Meaning of Negotiations in War Contexts

During this whole period of French political increasing power, it is important to recognize that negotiation was intense, but very often subservient to a war policy. It served to put an end to a war, as all the above-mentioned treaties recalled. It had often other goals relating to wars. It helped get allies for war itself or at least neutrals. Some examples can describe this use of negotiation. For reason of state, Cardinal Richelieu did not hesitate to initiate talks with a protestant king, Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden, and to pay him subsidies for fighting the catholic Habsbourg in 1630. By this objective

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alliance which undermined the emperor’s power in Germany, Sweden could notably be considered as the agent of France in the Thirty-Year War, without the need for France to be directly involved, at least until 1635. Later in 1667, the French convinced the Portuguese to continue their war against Spain, with their financial support. Allies could be convinced through subsidies, so that wars could be led by others, somewhere else, to one’s own profit. Callières wraps it up very well:

“A skillful negotiator can make profit of diverse moods and changes that occur in the country where he is, not only to counter the projects that are contrary to his prince’s interests, but also to help other projects that are advantageous to him. By his ingenuity, he provokes changes that are favorable to the business he is in charge of.”

Another example of negotiation contribution to French war activity is provided by Callières. In 1671, the Dutch ambassador in England, Jan Boreel was unable to appreciate the growing influence of the French ambassador Colbert de Croissy, who succeeded in getting Charles II of England involved in the offensive Treaty of Dover, where England would support France in its war against Holland. Duplicity of the raison d’état had no limits. Jan de Witt, the great pensionnaire of Holland, was not on guard at all, since Lionne, the French Secretary of State, had sent as ambassador to Holland in 1669, Arnauld de Pomponne, whose mission was supposedly to negotiate with the Dutch, but in fact was to keep them asleep, i.e. unaware of the war preparation against them. The next year, Grémonville was sent to the emperor to package a secret agreement of neutrality, as long as the war stayed outside the empire limits. A ten-year alliance agreement was also signed with the elector of Brandebourg. This whole sophisticated system of negotiation, that took three years in this case, was part of the “préparatifs diplomatiques” (diplomatic preparation) for war. Negotiations also served to create internal troubles in the enemy’s territory; for example Louis XIV contributed to the Hungarian nationalist cause, by helping Thököly and the revolt of the “malcontents” until 1683 and later Rakoczi at the beginning of the 18th Century in their fight against the emperor.

Though Callières is aware of the frequent use of negotiations in the context of war, and of its high efficiency there, if we look closely at his writings, there is also a double awareness that we will further examine in this text: first, war is not the most rational policy, and second, negotiations for the only purpose of helping war may not be the best use of this tool either. Callières will clearly show the limits of wars and a possible extension of negotiation use. To quickly understand the latter point, in his own practice as a negotiator, when he drafted the clauses of the Ryswick Treaty, Callières paid as much attention to the provisions that would help trade and exchanges between France and the United Provinces. Peace is not simply the silence of arms, it must be the signal for a renewal of business activity to foster an interdependence of interests. Peace by economics if you wish.

Louis XIV and the Limits of War in Political Rationality

At the end of his reign, Louis XIV left France in a critical state of exhaustion after decades of military campaigns. The Treaties of Utrecht (1713) and Rastadt (1714) are the ultimate signs of failure of a political expansion that was based on the military. The theories of the Sun King, alpha and omega of royal egocentric thought and action, internally and externally, based on force, had vanished. If at the beginning of his reign, through Mazarin, Louis XIV could still justify his use of force inside France to counter the fronde, a revolt by the nobility, and outside in Europe to fight Austrian and Spanish domination, the situation changed rapidly as Louis XIV and France came to prevail all over Europe through very long and costly wars. He had lost most of his allies, including many of these small German states that Mazarin had established in a pro-French Rhine League. France stood alone against all. Most European states were exceeded by the sun king’s never-ending hunger for more domination. Louis XIV seemed incapable of changing politics. There was never enough demonstration of his might. If Callières takes Alexander or Caesar as an example, when denouncing political conquests, it is relatively easy to apply his conclusions to Louis XIV:

“It is a major error of the vulgar to praise conquerors without making the distinction between conquests that are just and those that are not. Those who act on the latter and not the former merit universal hatred, since they bring to ruin their own country or that of their neighbor, by the unique motivation to satisfy a vain glory or an unmeasured ambition.”

For Callières, who worked close to the king, the war of the Spanish Succession (1701-1714) illustrated the very fact that Louis XIV went overboard. Louis XIV, whose personal vanity led him to want his grandson Philippe to inherit Spain, engaged France to the interests of his family vanity. The memoirs that Callières wrote to the Secretary of State Torcy changed nothing. Whatever persuasive arguments were put forward, war prevailed over a negotiated solution. Louis XIV’s desire to win over his neighbors dominated the rest of his reign. On his death bed, Louis XIV recognizes his error when confiding to the future king Louis XV:

“You must avoid to wage war: it is the ruin of the nations. Do not follow the bad example that I have given you in that respect; I have often undertaken war too lightly and have supported it by vanity. Do not imitate me, but be a peaceful prince.”

Do what I say, not what I do. Definitely, Louis XIV’s politics is in flagrant contradiction with the following principles that Callières stresses in his introductory chapter to Negotiating with Princes:

“Every Christian prince must have as a principal maxim to not use the means of arms to support rights until after all the means of reason and persuasion have been tried.”

28 Idem, pp. 136-137.
29 Dangeau (1854).
Louis XIV applied the reverse, going to war first and negotiating for peace later, subordinating reason and morality to passions, while “one wishes that a prince or a minister does not stray from moral principles and rather puts them into practice and accords them always to his political maxims.”

In this sense, the publication of his work with a dedication to Louis XIV would not only have been unwelcome for personal reasons. It would have meant for Callières an ultimate denial of his own political rationality where war is the last recourse, “l’ultima ratio regis” (the king’s last argument), to recall the formula written on the royal canons.

From Alternative Politics to Peace Equilibrium

Louis XIV and his permanent use of force, legitimized by absolute power, belonged to the 17th Century. His successor, the regent Philippe Orléans, will start anew, with an alternative politics. Callières could provide a foundation for this new way of ruling.

The Art of Handling Hearts or the Foundation of Societies

Deliberate or not, Callière’s work is finally published when the royal powers shifted to the hands of Philippe of Orleans. The latter, to whom Callières’s work is finally dedicated, incarnates a different political hope, and the regent’s personality will lead him to “a new practice of government, more liberal in appearance, looking for consultation and appeasement”. The author pushes for an alternative, more legitimate politics and political philosophy that break with the idea of leaving full reign to a the Sun King, the “lieutenant of god on earth”.

To secure this alternative legitimacy, here is an original conception of the foundation of societies, which is provided by the Science of the world:

“- You believe that persuasion was more important than force in establishing the first sovereigns?
- Without any doubt, in order to be convinced, you only need to consider that first men were born equal and that the power of some who raised above the others began by esteem and affection from a certain number of men, who judged them capable of leading and commanding, and put themselves in a position to obey them.”

Callières proposed a foundation of society that is not based on God, force or a social contract:

“It is the great art of handling hearts (manier les cœurs) and winning the inclinations of man which must be seen as the great work of the human mind, and that which

31 *De la Science du monde*, pp. 223-4.
33 *De la Science du monde*, p. 10.
formed the first societies between men, which gave them laws and which established various degrees of power between them that was passed on to their descendants."  

So, human persuasion holds the high road, even for royal power, because "power that is established on fear is neither sure or lasting."  

A benevolent rhetoric founded internal as well as international order. Without going as far as visionary William Penn’s Essay on the present and future peace in Europe (1693) or Abbot Saint-Pierre’s Project to bring perpetual peace in Europe (1713), Callières, in a more technical register, proposes a realistic conception in which peace is looked for, and maintained through, a network of national negotiators who engage in a dialogue with foreign princes based on friendship and confidence, on the European scene.  

**Negotiators’ Power Stronger than Laws**  

Callières builds his peace politics on the combined rationality of rulers and negotiators, and makes very strong statements where “the art of negotiating has more power than all the laws [human beings] have invented.” This quote, which is coherent with his conception of ruling as a capacity of handling hearts, is properly revolutionary. Callières does not simply state that a negotiator’s persuasion should be tried first and can therefore be more influential than force; it can be even stronger than laws themselves. Callières is breaking with both legal positivism and the power of the sovereign to edict what the laws are, or with natural law, that would anchor laws in a supreme source, most often god’s commandments themselves. For his, laws are conventions that come from human creation. The rule of law becomes secondary with respect to the rule of negotiators, as the latter permanently impact and shape the conventions, i.e. the changing laws, by their persuasive power.  

In Callières’s reasoning, laws and rights are often in contradiction with each other and contain so many questionable answers or gaps, that disputes – be it the breach of peace either in private or international contexts – are unavoidable and can only be resolved at their best not so much by a priori given norms, but by a conversation with princes through negotiators, who use their capacity to master their art, to refer to possible norms and to successfully influence the convention that hopefully follows.  

If Callières is conventionalist or contractualist; he is one in his own right. Far from inventing any type of horrible or ideal “state of nature” with a fictive ensuing social compact, as Hobbes or Locke would, he looks in front of his eyes and is inspired by the practical reality of bellicose or peaceful outcome. He concludes that controversies, involving conflicting rights and power, lead either to the prevalence of force – war politics – or to multiple discussions, exchange of arguments, in order to strike the balance in another direction, in search for common ground with all final decision makers, in a process that hopefully leads to a convention that everyone applies afterwards – this looks more like peace  

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34 Idem.  
35 Idem, p. 143.  
36 Penn (1693), Saint Pierre (1713).
politics. If Callières is a partisan of contracts, he sees them at their best as negotiators’ byproducts of handling hearts.

In the latter conception, if we push it further, there is no more any hiatus between political philosophy and law, between the fiction of an immutable social compact in public law, on one side, and the negotiated dynamic reality of legislative debates and of contracts of private law, on the other side. Negotiation, as part of the tradition of rhetoric, occupies a central stage in the philosophical foundation of both public and private laws, and even in the sphere of international law, that often everyone has a hard time conceiving as law, precisely because there is no third-party, an authority like a judge or a legislator to say who is right or wrong and to enforce a decision. Callières’s conception comprehensively defines the interactions among states (supranational law), between rulers and citizens (public law) and between citizens (private law), as originating in negotiation.

Building Peace within and among Nations

Callières understands this contrast between a war politics and a peace politics and this is why his work also demands a deepening of the art of negotiation, and provides tools to ensure peace politics with substance. It rests upon a “spirit of diplomacy”, as part of a new form of profane “European sociability,” which would be different from the constant state of war. Callières praises a peaceful European equilibrium:

“All the states of Europe have interactions and business to do between them so that we can see them as members of the same republic.”

In a way, this external equilibrium is the same at the international level as the one called for internally in the social contract, or in a more pragmatic way, as the need for a respect of internal order. In this way, Callières is closer to Saint-Pierre theory of “perpetual peace” than to Grotius theory of “just war”. As well as Hobbes, on the basis of his experience of religious civil wars in England in the first half of the 17th Century, describes a state of internal war in his Leviathan, where each man with his passions can disturb his neighbor (what Plaute summarizes as “Homo homini lupus”), Callières, who has lived all the second half of the 17th Century as a series of external wars, suggests a “Natio nationi lupus”, where one state, one sovereign can disturb the peace of any neighboring state and spread the war all over the continent in a dangerous game of dominos. On such a scene, the negotiator has a noble mission to prevent this terrible story to ever happen. Each prince must be aware of the importance of the mandate he gives his negotiator; this mandate must translate somehow the moral

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37 Callières (2002), p. 73.
38 Bély (2000).
superiority of peace over war. Thus, as internal peace and order are insured by national sovereignty that is embodied in the king or the assembly, in a philosophy of social compact that protects the life of citizens, similarly, the European republic of multiple sovereign states is represented by sovereigns and their negotiators, who should succeed in keeping a peaceful equilibrium among nations.

Most of the political philosophy at Callières’ time is focusing on “internal rest” (repos du dedans) with its adequate public institutions to put in place. Complementarily, Callières shows that this search is somehow insufficient and its answers unstable, because internal security of a nation is conditioned by “the good measures that one takes outside of the country”\(^{42}\), which a lot of “national” political theories of his epoch and of ours miss. His approach is clearly supranational in that sense that, whatever great form of government we may have inside, it will not fulfill people’s aspirations if states cannot live in peace with their neighbors. Because of states’ interdependence of interests,\(^{43}\) one single prince can upset the equilibrium and make inoperative the best form of government of any neighbor. Internal order, however perfect it is, runs the risk of being upset at any moment by the chaos of international disorder. This is therefore the latter that needs to be overcome. And force with reason of state will be of no use in that respect; conquerors with their powerful armies and their ephemeral hegemonies will never be able to impose their pax or their universal monarchy to the world. Only persuasion, according to Callières, may succeed, with the help of talented negotiators.

A Need for a Network of Skillful Negotiators

Adhering, in substance, to a principle of peaceful equilibrium, Callières appeals to international pluralism rather than to an illusionary hegemony, with its burdensome sequence of wars. In this way he believes that France and her negotiators could play a remarkable role in that context, as they may search for a European equilibrium, as they did notably at the Munster and Osnabruck conferences, whose Treaties of 1648 remain a model of balance.

At this moment of “crisis of European consciousness”\(^{44}\), Callières’s public, weary from wars, is receptive to alternative political modes. As Bély brightly puts it: “The moment was crucial, as at the beginning of this century, an ideological process started, which would lead to a sacralization of peace”.\(^{45}\) According to Callières, the “honest” man “wishes to see that the troubles, disputes and wars which divide nations stop and that nations are united by a spirit of peace and charity.”\(^{46}\)

\(^{41}\) Asinaria, 495.
\(^{42}\) Callières (2002), pp. 68 & 147.
\(^{43}\) Idem, p. 184.
\(^{44}\) Hazard (1961).
\(^{46}\) De la Science du monde, p. 124.
Negotiators are not simply less expensive than entire armies at war, and each one is not simply worth more than a regiment. If their mission succeeds, it will not produce the resentment that often follows war and leads to another one. Ambassadors do not simply finish wars, but try to prevent them, impeding the birth of offensive alliances in favor of defensive ones, and more generally working towards an atmosphere of reciprocal good will between nations. Especially when negotiators are permanently established in a country, i.e. independently of any war, as a signal of continuing friendship and transnational cooperation, they will always be busy, with two major functions: to know the other prince’s business and to further one’s own prince’s interests, i.e. to be an “honorable spy” in a constant search for information, and in perpetual communication with one’s host for the purpose of common prosperity. Ambassadors also contribute to the friendship among rulers, to commerce and exchanges in Europe. In a word, effective diplomats assure a great politics to a country, without overwhelming it with unpredictable commitments, chaos and exhaustion, as wars do.

In order to put this theory in practice, as much as Louis XIV’s political theory required military geniuses versed in war science, a ruler or prince needs diplomatic geniuses, versed in the art of negotiation. Training in one field or the other is indispensable. Callières alludes to the risk of amateurism in diplomacy and contrasts the frequent lack of functional rationality in negotiation with the professionalism required in the army.\(^47\) Even today, one would be more worried if a civilian led military maneuvers without proper training, than with a diplomat without training and without any talent for the job. Callières consider that we must “offer to the best ones the conduct of armies, of state government, and of foreign negotiations, as the mistakes one often makes in these fields are often without repair.”\(^48\) Indeed, when a mistake is made inside a country, in general, it will not drive foreign leaders into adverse action, and one’s own rulers can still correct such a mistake themselves, without any outside interference. On the contrary, when mistakes take place abroad, the consequences can be enormous, they can affect the decision of foreign powers, and it may not always be in the scope of one’s own rulers only to be able to amend them. It is a compelling reason to grant the external negotiation power to the most talented envoys. Continual negotiations à la Richelieu have to be led by persuasive ministers and ambassadors. This capacity to conduct negotiations skillfully is stressed by Callières as:

“One may say that the art of negotiating, well or badly implemented, gives its form, good or bad, to the general state of affairs, and to many particular ones.”\(^49\)

If Callières requires skills to be as high for the military and the diplomatic professions, he also shows the limits of any comparison between the art of war and the art of negotiating, or the reduction

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\(^48\) Callières (2002), p. 73.  
\(^49\) De la Science du monde, p. 135.
of the latter to the former, as too many people of his time and of ours wrongly believe negotiation to be the art of confrontation, dissimulation, and manipulation, and to be the simple “pursuit of military politics by other means” to parody Clausewitz. In negotiation, where parties try to build a mutually agreeable outcome, that would satisfy both sides’ interests, a good relationship matters, as well as a spirit of cooperation and efficient communication to lead the way. A military strategy considers the other as an enemy to wipe out. A negotiation strategy aims at building stable partnerships, with a search for joint gains. If of course, negotiation cannot avoid tensions, on distributive aspects for example or other aspects of interactions, even when these tensions appear, there are high incentives to perpetuate a problem-solving approach that may remain mostly beneficial to both parties.

The Ideal Negotiator, Using Right Techniques for Legitimate Ends

Not everyone is a natural negotiator. Diplomacy breaks with the war logic and makes it useless. It prefers a logic of ongoing connivance, in which it is not the other a priori who is the problem and it is I who responds, but it is the other who raises questions. My and their responses will help us find the solution. Humility is the negotiator’s friend and constitutes a condition to become a good one. Negotiators must keep themselves in the background to allow the others to move forward towards them without fear, and they must reappear in due time in subdued light. They must know themselves well and take the time to know others, their potential partners, and engage in a benevolent relationship with them, understanding their limitations, aspirations and passions, while trying by all means to reconcile their interests with their own. This is not manipulation or a dissimulation about the matter at hand, it is the subtle art of entrée en grâces, of entering in the other party’s graces. This is the cat that slides ever so softly underneath the blanket, taking advantage of a favorable conjecture.

Negotiation as an instrument can either serve, or hinder government actions, as well as individuals’ actions. Callières amply evokes the techniques that will help the negotiator achieve ends, but he goes further in his analysis, moving from procedural to substantive rationality. Convincing others, implementing one’s mandate through dialogue may be a necessary, but hardly sufficient condition in order to define a “good” negotiation outcome. Indeed it is not simply a know-how (savoir-faire) in terms of process that is needed for negotiation to be deemed successful, as in the old politics of war hegemony; it is also an underlying savoir-être of a honest person. Applied to the realm of international relations, it means a focus of diplomats on how to be a government representative serving legitimate ends in negotiations, like when they are rooted in a sincere prince’s wish to promote a peace politics. The fact that negotiation is a τεκτην, a technique, requires of course a mastery of

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means, but like the art of eloquence, beyond sophistic, it also requires justifiable ends, which was often not the case for most of Louis XIV’s diplomats.

In a negotiator, this *ad hoc* combination of means and ends recalls the difference in ancient rhetoric between an *orator* – a former name used for an ambassador with a personal reputation of being a *bonus vir*, a honest person –, and a *rhetor*, who uses the exact same skills, but who is ready to mobilize them for whatever ends, including wrongful ones. This instrumental neutrality of negotiation skills must be kept under control, and it can be in two ways: by the ends that the prince sets, and by the limits on the means that the prince’s negotiators are allowed to use in implementation of their mandate. It requires a real ετιοσ of an enlightened negotiator and prince, i.e. a praisable character of a person who resorts to rightful techniques for ethical objectives, and who is able to refuse to receive or give a mandate that would be illegitimate. And in any occasion, the slippery slope can happen in terms of means or ends. As an illustration of this point, Callières narrates the anecdote of Marshall de Fabert \(^51\) who was asked by cardinal Mazarin to make statements that amount to false promises and who gracefully declined the mission, asking the cardinal to keep him for other missions where he should rather guarantee the faithfulness to promises. Voltaire recalls the story:

> “Maybe a minister must have at his service good people and crooks. I can only be among the first ones.” \(^52\)

Lying and deception are other samples of wrongdoing that will not be acceptable, whatever ends they pretend to serve. If the art of negotiating falls in bad hands, it allows all the excesses, may “cause sudden revolutions in big states, arm princes and nations against their own interests; excite sedition, hatred or jealousy; form leagues and other treaties of diverse nature among princes and states with opposite interests; destroy and break the closest unions.” \(^53\)

Away from Machiavelli’s Prince, right means and right ends must go hand in hand. Callières insists that too often, it is by lack of proficiency that negotiators condescend to either wrong ends or means, to the *raison d’état*, i.e. the restriction of substantive rationality to the single fact that government ordered or backed a decision, without any other available justification. Such negotiators have not been creative enough, and spent enough time with their principal to figure out how the legitimate interests of their country could be served by other expedients.

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\(^{51}\) *Idem*, p. 88.

\(^{52}\) Voltaire (1867), p. 486.

\(^{53}\) Callières (2002), p. 73.
Callières: A Rhetorical Foundation of International Negotiations

The European Negotiator, Adaptable as Proteus

One can only become a cat by an active process of metamorphosis. Certain persons are naturally more talented than others, but “this does not preclude that education may have as much power on men as their natural inclinations.” Callières’s principal preoccupation was perfecting the negotiator. All legitimate means to acquire knowledge should be used to attain this objective. Apprentice negotiators must read much on the interests of the ruler and on their passions, on customs and laws that prevail in various countries, on the diverse forms of government and the centers of power, on the way power is exercised by ministers and on the factions that divide or bring them together. They must read the great diplomats of the past. They must also understand that all countries are interdependent and how Europe resembles a changing partition, according to the liking of its rulers. If negotiators are called upon by princes, the latter are not less human than they. There are many differences between the rulers of the world that one must know, like this habit of being praised by others. But well beyond particular facts, it is important to first “know men as they are in general.” In order to refine their knowledge, young diplomats must work, accompanied by seasoned colleagues, understand the terrain, and, finally, exercise the functions of an ambassador’s secretary in order to refine their ear and pen and construct their diplomatic career patiently.

Callières insists on the important role of passions and interests in human behavior. Thanks to history, one “understands imagination’s capacity when fueled by passions and what moves are theirs when the other ignites it. We also recognize reason’s capacities and limits, strengths and weaknesses.” Moreover, it appears that “most men act more out of passion than by reason” and that they “behave more ordinarily by reasons of interests than by rules of justice, so however just may be a resolution, it suffices that someone believes to have an interest to prevent it, for that one to oppose it.”

The negotiator must not expect to encounter beings of reason, but beings moved by passions and interests. This presumption of limited rationality in others obliges us to be prudent, if not silent at first. Negotiators must anticipate a possible asymmetry between themselves and the others, recognize it, without being upset about it and while using in a pedagogical action. Reason must be exercised with discretion. It is about “depriving oneself of one’s own passions in order to accommodate those of others.”

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54 De la Science du monde, p. 190.
55 Idem, p. 6.
56 Du Bel Esprit, p. 251.
57 De la Science du monde, p. 184.
58 Idem, p. 215.
59 Idem, p. 21.
Callières: A Rhetorical Foundation of International Negotiations

A negotiator will put oneself at the disposition of the other, in harmony. That is to say to make oneself empty in order to take in the music of the other. This first step requires a self-discipline that helps create or deepen the relationship with others, which is an enormous asset for eventually getting to the content of the matter.

“It is necessary to first understand the terrain, to examine the passions of those with whom one has audience, in order to bring to them the issues that they like and know best.”

Callières anthropology of negotiation is asymmetrical since professional diplomats learn to keep passions to themselves, but without preventing others from expressing them. The negotiator must hold fast to this, whatever the circumstances, in order to put all the chances on one’s side, and become this:

“agreeable mind which is the master of its passions and movements and which knows how to adapt its behavior to the different characters and passions of men with whom in interacts, which accommodates itself to their passions, even their weaknesses, in the goal to get them to just and reasonable sentiments, especially when important resolutions are concerned.”

In this sense, Callières is already a philosopher of enlightenment. He believes in the improvement of human beings and in the educational value the model negotiator has on fellow humans. In adopting an irreproachable behavior, this negotiator transforms the other, and disposes of a double savoir-faire: taking into account the other’s interest, on the one hand, and the art of the conversation, on the other hand. Such a behavior also includes an acute capacity to adapt to others as the old Proteus, one of Posseidon’s vassals, who according to the needs “will take all the forms, will change himself in whatever crawls on the earth, in water, in divine fire.”

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60 Idem, p. 18.
61 Idem, pp. 9-10.
62 Homerus, Odysseus, IV, 415.
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DYNAMIC EQUILIBRUM WITH SMALL FIXED TRANSACTIONS COSTS
Negotiating after we know who and what they are and stand for yet even then there will be a high price for a y kind of considerations. So on a political corrupt ways of allowing children to be taken away and put in foster homes that cause children to grow up hating society as long as we over look the things that permit pornography and sexual predator secrets and cover ups and young prostitutes we have no ground to stand on with our heads held high because shame is. nothing to be proud of. I think Donald Trump has made any recognised steps in such political negotiations obsolete. I suggest you watch what happens in the US/Korea negotiations set to take place now that the leaders of South and North Korea have agreed to denuclearise™ the peninsula. Rhetorical theory and a public address "dominated political rhetoric until the ideological turn " associated with the emergence of rhetorical criticism occurred. Allusion as a rhetorical device of political discourse. METHODOLOGY. Not surprisingly, the language applied in the political domain is rich in the use of phraseological allusions. which resulted in a political crisis in the USA and was followed by the resignation and disgrace of the president Richard Nixon. The politician argued that this is a tantrum that comes from powerlessness. Putin is our president, attacking him is an attack on our country. The Russian president was more muted in his own reply to the White House, however, saying that judging other countries is like looking in a mirror. When I was a kid, when we were arguing with each other in the playground, we used to say, whatever you say [about others] is what you are yourself. Putin added. Moscow would stand up for its own interests on the international stage, he argued, and the US will have to reckon with this, despite their The Peace of Westphalia established the precedent of peace reached by diplomatic congress and a new system of political order in Europe based upon the concept of co-existing sovereign states. The Westphalian principle of the recognition of another state's sovereignty and right to decide its own fate rests at the foundations of international law today. The European colonization of Asia and Africa in the 19th century and two global wars in the 20th century dramatically undermined the principles established in Westphalia. Peace talks are often a climax coming after months of preparation, secret negotiations and a degree of confidence-building. Not surprisingly a great deal of attention is paid to creating conditions conducive to success. But in many cases pitfalls arise once the agreements have been signed. Peacekeeping missions typically monitor compliance, create a buffer zone between warring parties (see chapter on peace support operations) and, depending on the scope of their mandate, assist in the implementation of peace agreements.